Scientists and philosophers of science tend to speak as if"scientific language" were intrinsically precise, as if those who use it must understand one another’s meaning, (62) they disagree．But, (63) , scientific language is not as different from (64) language (65) is commonly believed；it, too, is (66) to imprecision and ambiguity and hence to (67) understanding．Moreover, new theories(or arguments)are (68) , if ever, constructed by way of clear—cut steps of induction, deduction, and (69) (or falsification)．Neither are they defended, rejected, or accepted in (70) straight forward a manner． (71) , scientists combine the rules of scientific (72) with a generous mixture of intuition, aesthetics and philosophical commitment．The importance of (73) are sometimes called extralogical components of thought in the discovery of a new principle or laws is generally (74) ．We may recall Einstein’s (75) ："To these elementary laws there leads no logical path, (76) intuition, supported by being sympathetically in (77) with experience．"But the role of these extralogical components in persuasion and acceptance(in making an argument (78) )is less frequently discussed, partly (79) they are less—visible．The ways in which the credibility or effectiveness of an argument depends on a realm of common experiences, and (80) extensive pracuce in communicating those experiences in a common language, are hard to see precisely because such commonalities are taken for (81) ．Only when we step out of such a "consensuai domain"—when we can stand out on the periphery of a community with a common language．