单项选择题

American hopes that pressure from the US will force Japan to suddenly dismantle its trade barriers are almost certain to evaporate in disappointment^①. The fact is that Washington faces an obstacle far more formidable than a few power brokers in Tokyo’s government offices. It’s not in line with the centuries-old, deep-ingrained Japanese customs. To move the Japanese government, Washington government must move an entire nation. So far the US has had only limited success despite congressional threats to retaliate. In an April 9 nationwide broadcast, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone urged the Japanese to buy more imported goods and unveiled a long-awaited three-year plan to ease import restrictions. But this program was far short of what Washington hoped to see. White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan said the Japanese offered "few new or immediate measures." While the plan did promise fewer shackles on imports of telecommunications gear, medicine and medical equipment, it offered no relief for American forest products—which are among the most contentious trade issues.
Nakasone gives every sign of being secure in his desire to reduce a Japanese surplus in trade with the US that hit 36.8 billion dollars in 1984 and could soon top billion. Yet to rely on any Japanese political leader, no matter how popular he is at home, to reverse trade policies is to underestimate the culture and traditions that weigh heavily against a breakthrough^②. Big business and dozens of anonymous bureaucrats have as much power as Japan’s top elected leaders. "The whole concept that we can turn this around right now is obviously ridiculous," says an American trader who has lived and worked here since 1952. "The vested interests are being shaken and slowly moved, but at a pace too slow for the eye to follow." That view is echoed by a US diplomat closely involved in the efforts to open the Japanese market to American goods, Washington’s main solution to the ballooning trade ambulance. "Japan is a relationship society rather than a transactional one," he says. "You cannot alter that kind of a system with a television speech or a few general proposals, no matter how well-intended they are."
Beyond specific tariffs or other official barriers to imports, experts here say that the US faces these obstacles. Nearly total domination of the Japanese market by a few dozen giant conglomerates that strongly op pose even token competition—be it from abroad or emerging domestic firms. An elite, thickly layered bureaucracy that historically has drafted laws and regulations as well as enforced them, and both of these powers would be threatened by trade reforms. A longtime relationship between business and government that critics say fosters collusion and hinders foreign entry into domestic markets^③.
Which of the following is NOT mentioned as one of the trade obstacles in the text