TEXT C When Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice stood beside Afghan President Hamid Karzai, she made an
enlightened statement about cutting Afghanistan’ s opium production, saying: "It
is a problem that took a while to develop, and it will take time to end the
problem." Rice’ s statement in March is the clearest
confirmation yet of a gradual turn in U.S. policy since early 2004, when the
Bush administration and Congress were calling for an immediate crackdown on
Afghanistan’ s biggest cash crop. Her statement shows the United States’ new
patience and acceptance that it will take time for a democratic Afghanistan to
eliminate opium production. When the United States earlier
pushed Karzai to immediately end opium production in his war-tom country
-- without instituting the repressive tactics that historically have led to
rapid success -- the United States was giving the Afghan leader a virtually
impossible task. Afghanistan could please the United States only by aggressive
action that would further impoverish its already poor population and undermine
the government’ s legitimacy. The Taliban announced a ban on
growing poppies -- the source of opium -- in Afghanistan in July 2000, saying
this reflected the teachings of the Koran. Already feared by Afghans for its
brutality, the Taliban achieved compliance with its poppy ban by tearing up the
fields of a few early producers who violated tile ban, thereby showing that the
government was serious. The result of the Taliban’ s order was a
dramatic reduction in Afghan opium production, which fell from 3,600 tons in
2000 to just 185 tons in 2001. This caused world opium production to fall by
more than 60 percent. This wasn’t the first time that large and
rapid reductions in opium production have been achieved by massive government
repression. When the Communists took power in China in 1949, the
nation was a major opium producer and suffered from what may have been the
world’ s worst opium consumption problem. Within two years of a police crackdown
on opium production and consumption -- resulting in mass executions and
imprisonments -- opium production and use had essentially disappeared in
China. The Islamic Revolution in 1979 in Iran used some of the
same police-state tactics as China to eliminate the large production and
consumption of opium that had prevailed under the rule of the shah of
Iran. This year there may be yet another, slightly less dramatic
instance of successful reduction. Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is the
world’ s second-largest producer of opium. A rebel movement, tile United Wa
State Army, has control of the major poppy-growing areas and has already reduced
production by three- quarters in the past six years, with a realistic promise to
end production by June this year. It has accomplished this mostly by forcible
relocation of some 100,000 peasant farming families who grow poppies.
But if Afghanistan’ s current government resorted to the tactics of the
Taliban, the Chinese Communists, Iran’ s dictatorship and the rebels in Myanmar
to end opium production, it would rightly be condemned by the United States and
other democratic nations. This is because in each of the successful crackdowns
on opium, authorities relied on methods that are simply not acceptable in a
democratic nation, no matter how noble the purpose. The success
of anti-opium campaigns in more politically open settings is much more gradual.
Thailand, once a major world opium producer, is the leading example. A
combination of general economic development and targeted programs -- both crop
substitution and law enforcement -- led Thailand to almost end its opium
production over a period of more than a decade. Pakistan, also a formerly
significant producer, has managed to almost entirely exit opium production over
a similar period, notwithstanding a recent upturn in poppy harvests.
Going after traffickers rather than farmers, albeit politically much more
acceptable, is even more difficult. Few governments, authoritarian or otherwise,
have had a high degree of success in this arena. While ending poppy production,
Iran and Pakistan are still major drug traffickers. The recent Thai crackdown,
with the extra-judicial killing of 2,000 drug dealers in less than a year, seems
to have lessened domestic drug use but does not offer a helpful model for a
democracy-building Afghanistan. Secretary Rice’ s call for
patience in the fight against opium production in Afghanistan shows an
acceptance of the dilemma Afghanistan faces and is an encouraging indication
that the U.S. government has learned from history. Which one is not the reason why Afghanistan government can not eliminate opium quickly
A.Opium is closely related with the economy situation of Afghanistan people. B.It is a hard job which needs time. C.Afghanistan is not a democratic country. D.It is a problem left by history and it need more patience.