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Theories of the value of art are of two kinds, which we may
call extrinsic and intrinsic. The first regards art and the appreciation of art
as means to some recognized moral good, while the second regards them as
valuable not instrumentally but as objects unto themselves. It is characteristic
of extrinsic theories to locate the value of art in its effects on the person
who appreciates it. (46) . In this case, it becomes an open
question whether there might not be some more effective means of the same
result. Alterntively, one may attribute a negative value to art, as Plato did in
his republic, arguing that art has a corrupting or desiderative effect on those
exposed to it. The extrinsic approach, adopted in modern times
by Leo Tolstoy in What Is Art in 1986, has seldom seemed wholly satisfactory.
Philosophers have constantly sought for a value in aresthetic experience that is
unique to it and that, therefore, could not be obtained from any other source.
The extreme version of this intrinsic approach is that associated with Walter
Pater, Oscar Wilde, and the French Symbolists, and summarized in the slogan "art
for art’s sake." (47) . They also hold that in order to
understand art as it should be understood, it is necessary to put aside all
interests other than an interest in the work itself. Between
those two extreme views there lies, once again, a host of intermediate
positions. We believe, for example, that works of art must be appreciated for
their own sake, but that, in the act of apreciation, we gain from them something
that is of independent value. (48) . Why should not something
similar be said of works of art, many of which aspire to be amusing in just the
way that good jokes are The analogy with laughter...which, in
some views, is itself a species of aesthetic interestintroduces a concept
without which there can be no serious discussion of the value of art: the
concept of taste. (49) . We thus begin to think in terms of a
distinction between good and bad reasons for laughter. Amusement at the wrong
things may seem to us to show corruption of mind, cruelty, or bad taste; and
when it does so, we speak of the object as not truly amusing, and feel that we
have reason on our side. Similarly, we regard some works of art
as worthy of our attention and others as not. In articulating this judgment, we
use all of the diverse and confusing vocabulary of moral appraisal; works of
art, like people, are condemned for their sentimentality, coarseness, vulgarity,
cruelty, or self-indulgence, and squally praised for their warmth, compassion,
nobility, sensitivity, and truthfulness. Clearly, if aesthetic interest has a
positive value, its only when motivated the good taste; it is only interest in
appropriate objects that can be said to be good for us. (50)
. [A] Thus a joke is laughed at for its own sake, even though there
is an independent value in laughter, which lightens our lives by taking us
momentarily outside ourselves. [B] All discussion of the value of art tends,
therefore, to turn from the outset in the direction of criticism: Can there be
genuine critical evaluation of art, a genuine distinction between that which
deserves our attention and that which does not [C] Art is held to be a form
of education, perhaps an education of the emotions. [D] Artistic
appreciation, appreciation, a purely personal matter, calls for appropriate
means of expression. Yet, it is before anything a process of "cultivation",
during which a certain part of one’s "inner self" is "dug out" and some
knowledge of the outside world becomes its match. [E] If I am amused it is
for a reason, and this reason lies in the object of my amusement. [F] Such
thinkers and writers believe that art is not only an end in itself but also a
sufficient justification of itself.