问答题

  We, the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G-20, have a common goal of promoting employment, welfare and development in our countries. We are convinced that strong and sustained economic growth is necessary both at national and global level to achieve this end. We have therefore discussed the requirements for long-growth on the basis of our own experience and believe that domestic policy needs to address three tasks: establishing and maintaining monetary and financial stability; enhancing domestic and international competition; and empowering people to participate. Transparency and accountability within an internationally agreed framework of codes and standards remain key to ensuring sustained economic growth and stability at the global level. We agreed on the following key elements that will guide our domestic economic policies in the future. In implementing these elements, microeconomic aspects must be given due consideration. As these principles are interlinked, they must be implemented consistently, with due regard to possible trade-offs and complementarities, because many single elements have the potential of blocking the positive effects of others. While appropriate and credible policies are the basis for economic growth, they need to be backed by high-quality institutions, including ethical standards in corporate governance. Policymakers should build institutions in parallel with engaging in reforms and also ensure that institutions stay consistent with the requirements of a changing environment. However, given the diversity of institutional settings and the success of different economic strategies among G-20 countries, there is no single template for strong long-term growth. Policies need to be shaped to the special circumstances in individual countries.
    ……
 

【参考答案】

我们G20成员国的财政部长和央行行长们有着促进本国就业、福利和发展的共同目标。我们相信,只有在国家、全球两个层面上均实现......

(↓↓↓ 点击下方‘点击查看答案’看完整答案 ↓↓↓)
热门 试题

问答题
It is said that the Inuit have many words for snow, but when it comes to the Northwest Passage only one type of frozen water matters: multiyear ice. It can slice through the hull of a ship like a knife through butter and it persists in the passage’s waters despite unprecedented warming in the Arctic Ocean, thwarting shippers in search of a shortcut between Europe and Asia. The fabled Northwest Passage has made headlines ever since it thawed last year for the first time. For three centuries the quest for an expedited route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans rivaled today’s space race, with European superpowers vying for the prize. Hundreds of sailors and countless expeditions ventured into Canada’s Arctic waters, including such naval luminaries as Sir Francis Drake, Captain James Cook and the ill-fated Henry Hudson, who left his name—and lost his life—on the Canadian bay that marks its entrance. Now, with the Arctic’s sea ice shrinking at a rate of 10 percent per decade, this coveted shipping lane has opened for business—but shippers are not rushing to use it. The reason: as fate would have it, global warming appears to also be increasing the amount of potentially deadly multiyear ice chunks lurking in the newly opened pathway. The thing is, the Canadian Arctic has a totally different ice regime than the Arctic Ocean, says Stephen Howell, a climatologist at the Interdisciplinary Center on Climate Change at the University of Waterloo in Ontario. In fact, the Canadian Arctic Archipelago acts as a drain trap for ship-wrecking multiyear ice, Howell says. This year, for example, when the first-year ice in the passage had melted, it opened the way for multiyear ice (MYI) from the Queen Elizabeth Islands to flow into and clog the Northwest Passage. We call it a ’MYI invasion’ and that’s going to be the threat as we transition to an ice-free summertime Arctic, he says. The first-year ice, that’s sort of like Swiss cheese and you can just plow through it, Howell says. This ice freezes over a winter and is seldom thicker than three feet (one meter). Often, first-year ice melts the summer after it’s frozen, but if it doesn’t, it becomes thicker the following winter and becomes multiyear ice. The multiyear ice isn’t like Swiss cheese; it’s solid and trouble for ships that collide with it, he says.
问答题
Inflation: China’s least wanted export When inflation starts to kill people then it is a serious problem. Three people died and 31 were injured on Saturday in a stampede to buy cut-price cooking oil in the western Chinese city of Chongqing. China can no longer explain away inflation as a short-term result of floods and epidemics of animal disease—nor can it ignore the strains its macroeconomic policies are producing. Cooking oil is a special case—its price influenced by demand from China’s glut of new biofuel refineries—but the broader price of food has risen in recent months by more than 15 percent compared with a year earlier. Floods and other acts of God have had their effect, as has the global rise in wheat prices, but there are structural forces at work as well. Nor is inflation confined to food any longer: producer prices are creeping up. The PPI2 for manufactured goods was up 3.2 percent in October—many steel products rose by more than 10 percent—and the PPI is likely to go even higher when the recent 10 percent hike in the controlled pump price of diesel feeds through. Given the likelihood that more state-controlled prices will have to rise, and given that the official inflation data do not properly capture important prices, such as the cost of education, the real situation may be even worse. That is a worry for the rest of the world, used to enjoying the China price , a seemingly open-ended deflationary pressure on the world economy. The surge in Chinese inflation since June has barely fed through into export prices yet—bat it will. China’s currency has also been gently appreciating, but so far improvements in productivity have meant that Chinese manufacturers have not needed to raise export prices. If currency appreciation speeds up, that will change. The renminbi may have to rise faster because the tools that China is using to tackle inflation have not worked. Bank reserve requirements were biked again over the weekend, to 13.5 percent, but the strain on the banking sector’s profitability will start to tell. Interest rates have risen repeatedly, but with CPI3 inflation above 6 percent, and benchmark lending rates only slightly higher, real interest rates are low. There must now be a low, but non-zero, probability that China opts for a one-off revaluation of the renminbi in order to ease its domestic monetary problems. That would be the right move. The adjustment would be easier both for China and for the rest of the world if the renminbi had not been kept so low for so long. But the pain of unwinding global imbalances will only get worse the longer they are left. 注释:2PPI工业品出厂价格3CPI消费物价指数