Bird Flu: Communicating the Risk The recommendations listed below are grounded in two convictions(信念): that motivating people to start taking bird flu seriously should be a top priority for government health departments, and that risk communication principles provide the best guidance on how to do so. Start where your audience starts. Telling people who believe X that they ought to believe Y naturally provokes resistance. You can't ignore X and just say YY-Y-Y-Y. You can't simply tell people they're wrong. You've got to start where they are, with X, and empathically explain why X seems logical, why it's widely believed, why you used to believe it too.., and why, surprisingly, Y turns out to be closer to the truth. The biggest barrier to sounding the alarm about bird flu is that it's flu usually seen as a ho-hum(漠不关心的) disease. It would help if people stopped calling every minor respiratory infection 'a touch of the flu' but that's not going to happen. Empathy is the only answer. Instead of ignoring the fact that people think flu is minor, or berating people for thinking that flu is minor, acknowledge that even some pub{ic health authorities use the term 'flu' in ways that minimize its seriousness. After making common cause with the public--'we have all ignored influenza for too long'--talk about how horrific the next flu pandemic(流行病) may be compared with the annual flu. Don't be afraid to frighten people. For most of the world right now, though, apathy(漠不关心)is the problem--not denial. We can't scare people enough about HSN1. WHO has been trying for over a year, with evermoredramatic appeals to the media, the public, and Member States. Until a pandemic begins, there's little chance we'll scare people too much. Research evidence won't protect you from criticism, of course. Fear appeals often provoke angry pushback from people questioning your motives or your competence, accusing you of 'crying wolf' or provoking 'warning fatigue' or panicking the public. That happened after WHO Western Pacific Regional Director Shigeru Omi said that, in a worst case, a bird flu pandemic could kill up to 100 million people (a well-justified estimate). Of course, there is a genuine downside to issuing warnings that turn out to be unnecessary. Although panic is unlikely and warning fatigue is temporary, there is some credibility loss, especially if the warnings were exaggerated or overconfident. But consider the alternative. Which is worse, being criticized for 'unduly' frightening people or being criticized for failing to warn people? Acknowledge uncertainty. When the first Thai bird flu outbreaks subsided(平息) in 2004, a senior public official said: 'The first wave of bird flu outbreak has passed.., but we don't know when the second wave will come, and we don't trust the situation... So the Public Health Ministry is being as careful as possible.' This exemplifies two risk communication principles: acknowledge uncertainty and don't overreassure. During Malaysia's first outbreak, tests were pending regarding what strain of flu was killing the chickens. Senior veterinary official Hawari Hussein said, 'We know it is HS, but we're hoping it won't be H5N1.' This very brief comment not only acknowledges uncertainty; it also expresses wishes, another good crisis communication practice. Everyone shared Hussein's hope, but feared the worst. Overconfident overreassurancc ('the situation is under control, everything is going to be fine') is terrible risk communication. Paradoxically, people usually find it alarming. They sense its insincerity and become mistrustful even before they know the outcome. But overconfident warnings are also unwise. There is so much we don't know about H5N1. How many people will it infect? How quickly will it spread? How long will it last? How long will it take for an effectiv A．Y B．N C．NG
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A 解析：纵观全文可以得知，这篇文章主要是向政府卫生部门建议应该如何向公众传达禽流感的危险信息。故为Yes。